[BPDG Drafts]
Is there a consensus?

This week's BPDG testimony in DC has spawned a slew of articles that would have you believe that the BPDG is on the verge of reaching a consensus.

Indeed, many of BPDG's representatives did testify that they would have reached an agreement on their restrictive, legally mandated Digital TV standard by May 17. But those of us on the BPDG's mailing-list saw a different story.

On April 24th, Philips released a stirring proposal for the inclusion of new technologies on Table A, the master list of approved outputs and recording methods. The Philips proposal goes farther than any of its previous assays, moving away from Hollywood's stated plan to only approve those technologies that they license ("We don't know what we'll approve, but we'll know it when we see it."

Some highlights:

(c) To qualify as an Authorized Digital Output Method or as an Authorized Recording Method, a technology shall, in addition, meet the following criteria.

1. The specification and compliance rules must be final and clearly defined.
(Translation: "We know it when we see it" isn't good enough)

2. The technology must be available under rules that are limited to the broadcast protection functionality [prevention of unauthorized redistribution outside of the home or personal digital networks] and must impose limitations and requirements no more limiting than those set forth in Sections X.3 through X.11 of these Requirements.
(Translation: This is about controlling redistribution on the Internet, so don't try to sneak in measures that will stop sharing with friends)

3. Without limiting the foregoing, recording and output technologies authorized for use by an Approved Technology must authorize the use of digital outputs and recordable media protected by the other Approved Technologies without need for further authorization or approval.
(Translation: Anything we approve must interoperate with everything else, no fair requiring more authorization)

4. The technology and rules must not be subject to change other than under a clearly defined consensus process (including both licensees and content providers) that allows time for implementation (in ordinary circumstances to be not less than 18 months), and adequate notice before any change becomes effective and may be implemented, to ensure that no implementers have any advantage in implementation. (Translation: If you want to change the rules, you'll need to go through this whole process again; this isn't a carte blanche to keep on making up ever-more-stringent rules)

5. The technology must be available on a nondiscriminatory basis under license with fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions that are appropriate to and do not reach beyond the scope of broadcast protection.
(Translation: Don't think that because your technology got on the list that you'll get to charge a fortune for it and/or lock out your competitors)

6. An Approved Technology may not allow content providers to encode content using codes recognized by the technology in a way that causes the technology to impose restraints on Unscreened Content or Marked Content beyond those reasonably necessary to prevent [unauthorized redistribution outside of the home or personal digital networks].
(Translation: Your tech can only offer those protections that will keep video off the net; you can't include "features" that would allow Hollywood to set up more stringent protections)

Hot stuff! Philips showed remarkable bravery in its willingness to put this proposal in front of the BPDG. It certainly polarized the rest of the group: two days later, the 5C and MPAA companies released a joint counter-proposal.

The 5C/MPAA proposal could not be more different from the Philips proposal. While Philips calls for strict terms and restrictions on the standard's ability to constrain innovation and freedom, the 4C/5C/MPAA proposal makes no bones about the group's actual raison d'etre: to control and curtail what you do with the devices you own and the video signals you buy.

Some highlights:

[This proposal recommends that the Parallel Group address] a standard by which a technology could be removed from the list where such technology has been compromised (where the level of "compromise" is substantially higher than the level required for the process contemplated in paragraph iii, above), which standard would take into account the protection of Unscreened Content and Marked Content from unauthorized redistribution (including from unauthorized Internet redistribution), and the impact on content owners, consumers and manufacturers resulting from the continued use of such compromised technology and from any removal of such technology from the list. This proposal recommends that the Parallel Group will address a process by which (a) requests can be made to remove a technology from the list on the basis that such standard has been met; (b) interested parties can object to such requests for removal; and (c) a timely determination would be made as to whether or not such technology will be removed from Table A (after a reasonable grace period).
(Translation: Even if a device gets approved, and I manufacture it, and you buy it, the BPDG could still decide later on that it is illegal, and then it's goodbye device, hello boat-anchor)

The proposal gets needlessly technical from here on in, but it's just the same old song with a new tune: your technology won't be approved unless you can convince Hollywood of its merit; you can't send video to a computer unless it is limited to 30fps and 720 x 480 resolution.

The "consensus" is an illusion. Philips is pulling in one direction, and 5C/MPAA is tugging in the other. Now is the time to turn up the heat. As the press and the public start asking awkward questions of the BPDG participants, the fracture lines will widen, and just maybe, the "consensus" will fall to pieces.

• The Philips Proposal (84k PDF)
• The 5C/MPAA proposal (192k PDF)
• The 5C/MPAA Table A criteria (104k PDF)